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Abstract
The urbanization of Africa has been recent, rapid and no-
tably disimllar from the pattern of urbanization that oc-
cured previously in Europe. Significantly, the
urbanization of Africa has occured in the absence of struc-
tural transformation. Within this reality, refugees are
viewed by African host governments as exacerbating the
problems of urbanization and are most often located in
government-designated and spatially segregated sites -
refugee camps or settlements. Often in defiance of such
policies, most refugees with urban backgrounds tend to
congregate in urban centres. The case study of Sudan illus-
trates that even where the stay of certain refugees in urban
areas may be formally regularised by governments there
are nonetheless identifiable common patterns and prob-
lems arising out of and causing the spatial segregation of
refugees away from urban centres. It is argued that the un-
derlying reality of urbanization in Africa plus the pro-
tracted problems for governments created by urbanisation
generally and cross-border ethnic solidarity in the case of
many refugee movements in Africa, shape current hostile
refugee policies towards urban refugees.
Résumé
L'urbanisation de l'Afrique est de date récente. Elle s’est
faite de façon rapide et a suivi un parcours particulière-
ment différent de celui emprunté par l’urbanisation pré-
cédente de l’Europe. De manière significative,
l'urbanisation de l'Afrique s'est produite en l'absence
d’une transformation structurelle. Avec cette réalité
comme toile de fond, les réfugiés sont perçus par les gouver-
nements hôtes des pays d’Afrique comme aggravant les
problèmes d'urbanisation, et ils sont le plus souvent ins-
tallés dans des lieux spécialement désignés par les gouver-
nements et spatialement séparés – notamment des camps
de réfugiés ou des zones d’installations.
Souvent en faisant fi de telles politiques, la plupart des
réfugiés issus des milieux urbains tendent à se rassembler
dans les centres urbains. L'étude de cas du Soudan dé-
montre que même là où des gouvernements arrivent à
sanctionner le séjour de certains réfugiés en milieux ur-
bains, on peut néanmoins identifier des tendances com-
munes et des problèmes qui résultent de, et provoquent,
la ségrégation spatiale des réfugiés loin des centres ur-
bains.
L’article soutient que la réalité sous-jacente de l'urbani-
sation en Afrique, ajoutée aux problèmes à n’en pas finir
confrontant les gouvernements et engendrés, d’une part
par l’urbanisation en général, et de l’autre par la solidari-
té ethnique transfrontalière dans le cas de beaucoup de
mouvements de réfugiés en Afrique, tout cela pris ensem-
ble, façonne les politiques actuelles relatives aux réfugiés
qui sont hostiles aux réfugiés urbains.
Introduction and Statement of the Problem
T
he question of urban refugees should be placed in the
context of the rapid process of urbanization experi-
enced by most African countries. What is peculiar
about the process of urbanization in this region is that it is
taking place in the absence of structural transformation.1 In
the West, rural–urban migration took place in the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries in the context of massive
process of structural transformation reflected in technologi-
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cal innovation, industrialization, and shrinkage of the pri-
mary sector—agriculture. As a result, those who were sepa-
rated from their means of production were easily absorbed
in manufacturing and later in the expanding service sector.
In much of Africa, however, the manufacturing sector is
very small and its capacity of absorption is quite limited.
The manufacturing sector has been experiencing further
constriction due to macro-economic policy reforms intro-
duced in connection with structural adjustment programs.
Many adjusting economies in sub-Saharan Africa have
been experiencing a process of de-industrialization due to
inability to compete with economies that enjoy technologi-
cal comparative advantages. In most sub-Saharan African
countries, the primary sector––agriculture––still remains a
dominant economic activity. However, the performance of
the agricultural sector has been prejudicially affected by
adverse weather conditions, lack of productivity-enhancing
modern technological inputs, and high population pres-
sure. Horizontal expansion of commercial agriculture
which takes place in the absence of well-developed policy
and institutional framework and enforcement capability
has led not only to loss of traditional resource rights but
also to degradation of productive capability of renewable
resources. In the countries that have been experiencing
expansion of commercial agriculture, the property rights
regimes are so inauspicious that they provide no adequate
protection against encroachment by commercial interests.2
In most cases, those who are squeezed out in the process or
separated from the means of production are left with no
alternative but to migrate to urban areas in search of
sources of livelihoods. Sub-Saharan Africa has been expe-
riencing rapid urbanization in the context of lack of protec-
tion of pastoralist and peasant land and resource rights. The
poor performance and the low capacity of absorption of the
agricultural sector is also substantially exacerbated, on the
one hand, by the excessive subsidies paid to farmers in the
European Union and North America and, on the other, by
the restrictions imposed by the European Union and the
US government on imports of primary and processed agri-
cultural products from developing countries, including Af-
rica. Governments in the EU and the US preach liberalism
but in reality their markets are inaccessible because they are
protected. This policy has had a detrimental impact on the
economies of African countries and has resulted not only
in the economic stagnation of the agricultural and the
manufacturing sectors but also in squalor and poverty in
the urban areas where there are large concentrations of
unrecognized refugees. The hostility of host governments
and, to some extent, host populations towards them cannot
be understood in isolation from what goes on in the inter-
national arena.
In sub-Saharan Africa, rural-urban migrants invariably
end up in the saturated informal sector where competition
is fierce. The informal sector is the only conceivable source
of livelihood for: (i) retrenched public sector employees;
(ii) workers laid off from the private sector due to ration-
alization/restructuring or de-industrialization; (iii) new job
seekers; and (iv) those who need to supplement their mea-
gre incomes. Some of these are consequences of structural
adjustment programs. In the past, the informal sector was
considered “spongy,” reflected in an “unlimited” capacity
of absorption. These days, there are no analysts who believe
that  the capacity of the informal sector to absorb new
entrants is unlimited.
The other factor that is contributing to rapid urbaniza-
tion in Africa is the educational system, which is highly
elitist and inevitably detaches students from their particular
socio-cultural environments. Most of the curricula taught
in African schools are designed to prepare students for
employment in the modern urban sector. Unfortunately,
this sector is stagnant for reasons explained above, and its
capacity to absorb additional labour is either limited or
non-existent. The millions of students who complete sec-
ondary education often leave school without any vocational
skills and are hence unemployable. Those from rural areas
often seek an escape from rural life, instead ending up in
urban slums, and try to eke out a meagre existence in the
informal sector. Though the informal sector is dynamic, its
capacity of absorption is not unlimited. In most African
countries, it is stretched to a breaking point.
The fact that this rapid urbanization is taking place in the
absence of structural transformation also means that the
states are unable to generate enough revenues from taxes to
invest in the social and physical infrastructures to cope with
increased demand. Thus, in most of sub-Saharan Africa, the
infrastructures in urban areas are either weak or are on the
verge of collapse. This can also exacerbate the HIV/AIDS
pandemic due to shortages of housing, sanitary facilities,
health services, and educational opportunities. When di-
verse groups inhabit slum areas in cities and individuals
originating from different ethnic, religious, and geographi-
cal origins and different cultural backgrounds intermingle,
the informal institutional rules and social norms that pre-
viously regulated their sexual and other social behaviours
tend to weaken if not break down. This creates fertile
ground for the spread of HIV/AIDS and other sexually
transmitted diseases.
Urban Refugees: Unwelcome Guests
In Africa as elsewhere in developing societies, governments
loathe the presence of refugees in  urban  areas.3 This is
because they see the presence of refugees as a factor that
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exacerbates the urban condition. Hence they prefer to place
all refugees regardless of their occupational, educational,
and experiential backgrounds in government-designated
and spatially segregated sites––refugee camps or settle-
ments. More often than not, these sites are devoid of free-
dom of movement and residence.4 Some governments also
apply draconian measures to control the behaviour and
political activities of refugees in such sites.5 Whenever refu-
gees want to leave such sites they are required to seek per-
mission.6 Nearly all African host governments do not
formally recognize the rights of refugees to settle in urban
areas.7 Understandably, therefore, most refugees with urban
backgrounds are  opposed  to living in refugee  camps or
settlements where no employment opportunities, amenities,
and freedom of movement exist. Thus, most refugees with
urban backgrounds tend to congregate in urban centres,
defying host governments’ policies. As a result, they are in
most cases treated in a manner that violates their basic
human rights.8
As we shall see in a brief case study of Sudan, there may
be some cases of refugee populations whose stay in urban
areas may  be formally regularized by governments, but
these are exceptions. Nevertheless, notwithstanding hostile
government policies, in  all refugee-hosting countries in
sub-Saharan Africa, there are tens of thousands of refugees
who reside in urban areas illegally. This is because govern-
ments are either  unable  to enforce their own laws and
policies or refugees subvert the restrictions by developing
complex strategies, including adoption of fictive identities,
to pass as citizens.9 Given the artificial construction of many
African borders which were established by bisecting com-
munities, it is not easy to distinguish between citizens and
non-citizens who often share identical structural traits.
The Rationale of Placing Refugee in Spatially
Segregated Sites
Even though the rationales discussed in what follows are
based on the experience of sub-Saharan Africa, they are
relevant to all developing countries.10 Though the rationales
that underpin different host governments’ policies on urban
refugees may be  varied, it is argued here that there are
identifiable common patterns that characterize most gov-
ernments’ responses to urban refugees. These include:
1. prevention of integration of refugees into host socie-
ties;
2. minimization of actual or perceived risk to national
security;
3. prevention of refugee competition with nationals for
employment, self-employment, resources,  and serv-
ices;
4. aversion to ethnic imbalance in border areas;
5. shifting of responsibility in meeting refugees’ needs to
the international donor community indefinitely, in-
cluding UNHCR;
6. creation of an opportunity to develop previously ne-
glected remote areas; and
7. prevention or minimization of societal insecurity.
Each of these factors is discussed in what follows briefly.
1. Prevention of Integration of Refugees into Host Societies
The three conventional solutions to the problem of refugees
are enshrined in the Statute of the UNHCR. Paragraph 1 of
the Statute states:
The United Nations Commissioner for Refugees, acting under
the authority of the General Assembly, shall assume the func-
tion of providing international protection, under the auspices
of the United Nations to refugees who fall within the scope of
the present Statue and of seeking permanent solutions for the
problem of refugees by assisting Governments and, subject to
the approval of the Governments concerned, private organisa-
tions to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of such refugees, or
their assimilation within new national communities.11
It is important to point out, however, that in all African
countries—and this is true in all developing countries12—
refugees are accepted as temporary guests, notwithstanding
the fact that the United Nations in co-operation with gov-
ernments is required to seek permanent solutions to the
problem of refugees by integrating the latter into receiving
communities. In the developing countries, settlement in first
countries of asylum does not provide a permanent solution
to the refugee problem. This is true regardless of the length
of their stay in countries of asylum. Refugee status is granted
in anticipation that they would return home subsequent to
the elimination of the factors that prompt them to flee. Thus,
most host government policies are designed to prevent
rather than to promote integration of refugees into host
societies.  For example, despite long-standing open door
policies13 in Tanzania, Uganda, and Sudan, their reception
and settlement strategies are designed to prevent rather than
to promote integration of refugees. Treatment of refugees in
these countries is formally based on the general principles of
international conventions, mainly that asylum is a peaceful
and humanitarian act; that voluntary repatriation is the ideal
and most durable solution to the refugee problem; and that
in the absence of any foreseeable prospects for repatriation,
refugees are to be settled away from border areas with the
aim of helping them to become self-supporting. Self-settle-
ment is regarded by all sub-Saharan African countries as an
unacceptable option.14 The single most important reason
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why the consecutive governments in these countries reject
self-settlement of refugees is, inter alia, to prevent refugees
from integrating into the host communities.
This does not suggest, however, that there are no refugees
that self-settle outside of government designated sites by
defying host government policies.15 This does not also sug-
gest that there are no African refugees who become inte-
grated into host societies by disregarding government
policies. There are refugee communities that integrate
themselves into host societies by relying on pre-existing
historical, ethnic, language, and faith-based informal social
networks. For example, notwithstanding the fact that the
factors that produced pre-independence Eritrean refugees
have indisputably ceased when the country achieved its
independence, a substantial proportion of the refugees in
Kassala and Port Sudan towns have stayed put. These are
invariably people who share common ethnicity, religion,
language, and way of life with the local residents.16
For example, the government of Sudan enacted its own
national legislation to this end, known as the Regulation of
Asylum Act, 1974. The Asylum Act lays down the principles
upon which the country’s refugee policies and practices are
based. There are some fundamental restrictions which are
designed to perpetuate rather than to end refugee status. For
example,  refugees  are  prohibited  from  owning land  and
immovable property.17 Non-compliance is punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding one year.18 The raison d’être of
the limitation on freedom of movement and residence is
prevention of integration of refugees into the host societies
because they are accepted as temporary guests until the fac-
tors that prompt their displacement are eliminated.19 For
example, the late Dr. Ahmed Karadawi, who was an assistant
commissioner for refugees in the Ministry of Interior, said,
As most of the refugee situations in the Sudan have not devel-
oped because of any deliberate intention either on the part of
the refugees or on the part of the government, how realistic is
the approach that aims at helping the refuges to settle perma-
nently in the Sudan and become Sudanese? The strategy of what
is called ‘integration’ by the aid agencies is a European import
oblivious to the local processes that have brought refugees into
the Sudan.20
Karadawi could not be regarded as xenophobic or refugee-
unfriendly by any standard.21 This clearly demonstrates that
Sudan’s refugee policies are designed to perpetuate rather
than to end refugee status. This was further amplified by the
Commissioner for Refugees, who argued that the term “in-
tegration” is misleading because it does not give the right
sense of the treatment accorded to refugees in the Sudan. He
said,
If you talk of integration as a sort of naturalisation, this is
completely rejected in the Sudan … and I feel that refugees will
not like it. Being a refugee in a country for 20, 30 or 100 years,
I don’t think will deprive you of your own nationality, your own
origin… That is why in Sudan… this policy of local settlement,
rather than local integration [is adopted].22
Thus in Sudan as in many other developing societies, refugee
camps and settlements are created as a means of preventing
refugees from incorporating themselves into the larger soci-
ety. The Commissioner for Refugees further maintained,
. . . refugees should be given a certain place [a camp or settle-
ment] to continue their own sort of relations, with their own
people [not with Sudanese], not to forget their country, because
we are not interested that they will forget their countries, they
have to go back. We don’t want more population in this coun-
try: enough is enough.23
Camps and settlements are thus established to perpetu-
ate, rather than to bring to an end, refugee status and to
accomplish this by blocking the incorporation of refugees
into host societies. In the government’s view the best way
to achieve this goal is to keep refugees in spatially segregated
“containers” so that they are able to maintain their old
relationship with each other in isolation from local popu-
lations and consequently maintain their collective national
identity.
It is important to state that this is not only true in Sudan.
It is generally true of all refugee-hosting countries in the
developing societies. The statements of the Sudanese Com-
missioner for Refugees and the Assistant Commissioner
accurately encapsulate the principles underlying nearly all
government policies in the developing world. On paper,
Tanzania made a general offer of naturalization to all refu-
gees in 1980, but bureaucratic incompetence and the refu-
gees’ economic inability to meet prohibitive charges
prevented many refugees from seizing the opportunity to
be naturalized.24 However, during the Great Lake crisis in
the mid-1990s, not only did Tanzania backtrack on natu-
ralization, but it also closed its borders with Rwanda. The
country’s Foreign Minister said, “We are saying enough is
enough. Let us tell the refugees that the time has come for
them to return home and no more should come.”25 The
country also forcibly repatriated thousands of Rwandan
refugees in 1996 in a situation where the political condi-
tions were unsafe. In the 1980s, not only were Rwandan
refugees forcibly repatriated from Uganda after having
lived there for decades, but they were also victimized by
Obote’s government under which over 60,000 died in the
Lwero triangle of Buganda.26 All the available studies show
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that in all developing countries, refugees are accepted as
temporary guests and placement of refugees in spatially
segregated rural sites is seen as an indispensable instrument
of operationalizing such a policy.27 It is also worth mention-
ing here that in sub-Saharan Africa, most international
assistance is directed to refugee camps and formal settle-
ments.28
2. Minimization of Actual or Perceived Risk of National
Security
There is an excessive tendency on the part of host govern-
ments to label the presence of refugees, including immi-
grants, in their territories a security threat. The single most
important reason why governments place refugee issues on
the security agenda is to excuse even the most unjustifiable
or draconian measures they take against them. Such meas-
ures are often justified in terms of the need to avert the
danger that might occur in the absence of such measures.
Security, Waever argues, is:
… a practice, a specific way of framing an issue. Security dis-
course is characterised by dramatising an issue as having abso-
lute priority. Something is presented as an existential threat: if
we do not tackle this, everything else will be irrelevant… And
by labelling this a security issue, the actor has claimed the rights
to deal with it by extra-ordinary means, to break the normal
political rules of the game … Something is presented as existen-
tially threatened, and on this basis it is argued the ‘we’ must use
extra-ordinary means to handle the threat.29
If a government places an issue on the security agenda,
whatever measures it takes to avert the alleged danger are
said to be dictated by necessity. Thus if refugees are consid-
ered to constitute a threat to national security, whatever
measures governments take to protect themselves and their
citizens against the alleged threat of insecurity, including
their confinement in spatially segregated sites, are consid-
ered justifiable. The presence of Eritrean refugees in Sudan
was, for example, securitized from the outset.30 The Suda-
nese government of the time even went to the extent of
handing over to Ethiopia twelve prominent Eritreans in
1961.31 The placement of refugees in spatially segregated
sites is therefore designed to facilitate control of refugee
movements and their activities.32 If refugees are allowed to
settle  freely  among local  populations, host governments
often fear or pretend to fear that not only may they freely
engage in subversive activities and threaten the security of
receiving areas and their countries of origin, but also influ-
ence citizens by “contaminating” their political views. Thus,
it is not uncommon for host governments to view refugees
as potentially dangerous that could radicalize their citizens.
Hence their placement in spatially segregated sites is seen as
a means of avoiding the danger of insecurity.
3. Prevention of Competition for Resources and Services
Spatial segregation enables governments to prevent refugees
from competing with nationals for employment, land,
water, pasture, firewood, construction materials, common
property resources, employment, transportation, housing,
and income-generating opportunities. Many developing
countries have been facing shortages of such resources due
to many reasons. For example, in Sudan, though over half
of the total refugee population managed to avoid them, all
refugees are by law required to reside in camps and settle-
ments in accordance with government policy. Those who
self-settle outside camps and settlements often face the risk
of being rounded up, harassed, detained, and deported to
rural areas.33 In some countries refugees found outside the
designated areas are deported to their countries of origin
even when the factors that prompted their flight are not
eliminated.34
As we saw before, the rapid process of urbanization is
taking place in all sub-Saharan Africa in the context of a
stagnant manufacturing sector and over-saturated service
and  informal sectors. Unemployment  in  urban areas  is
rampant. Governments and host populations thus resent
the presence of refugees because they are said to compete
for scarce employment and self-employment opportuni-
ties. Though the economic crises facing African countries
have nothing to do with the presence of refugees, the latter
are invariably blamed for being the causes of economic
crisis and of shortages of housing, transportation, water,
electricity, employment, etc. Refugees are also blamed for
theft, crimes, prostitution, and other forms of anti-social
behaviour.
Ironically, the blame game has been exacerbated by
multi-party elections that have been spreading over most
sub-Saharan African countries since the end of the 1980s.
This is contrary to expectations. In many countries, oppor-
tunist politicians use the refugee card to stir up xenophobic
sentiments among their constituencies in order to win votes
by blaming shortages of employment opportunities, re-
sources, and services, as well as crimes, on refugees. In
refugee-hosting countries, many parliamentary candidates
promise to throw out refugees if they are elected. This is not
only true in the developing countries but the refugee card
is vote-winning even in “mature” democracies.
4. Prevention of Ethnic Imbalance in Border Areas
Colonial borders divide many ethnic groups, and govern-
ments fear that if refugees are allowed to self-settle among
members of their own ethnic groups in border areas, the
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numerical sizes of some of the border communities would
increase substantially. There is a concern on the part of
governments that this might upset the pre-existing ethnic
balance of power. In some cases, this imbalance could jeop-
ardize the security and stability of local communities. Thus,
governments opt for relocation of refugees to areas away
from people with whom they share a common ethnicity. In
Sudan this consideration has been the main factor as to why
the authorities in the local government in the east were
reluctant to accept the establishment of refugee settlements
in Kassala Province.
The large majority of the Eritrean refugees  who fled
Eritrea in the second half of the 1960s were from the Beni
Amer ethnic group. Having members of their ethnic group
provided a soft landing in the border areas with Sudan.
Because of pre-existing trade and other ties, they had long-
standing social networks which they made use of in adver-
sity and consequently found new homes among the border
Sudanese communities.
However, the Beni Amer had a long-standing feud with
another Sudanese border community, the Hadendowa.
This feud degenerated into war in the early 1940s over
grazing rights along the Eritrean frontier which the Beni
Amer regarded as their own. A tense situation exploded in
1942 when a simple incident of a camel theft triggered a
bloody tribal war which raged off and on for more than
three years.35 Though a peace settlement was successfully
negotiated in December 1945 in which the Beni Amer
agreed to pay the Hadendowa thousands of pounds com-
pensation and surrendered about 700 rifles36 the relation-
ship between the two tribes has always been tense.
When nearly 30,000 Eritrean Beni Amer refugees arrived
in the border areas inhabited by Sudanese Beni Amer and
the Hadendowa in February and March of 1967, the
number of Sudanese Beni Amer increased dramatically not
only in the rural border areas but also in the urban border
town of Kassala. This created a sudden imbalance which the
Sudanese authorities feared could encourage the Sudanese
Beni Amer to attack their long-standing adversaries. Hence
a decision was taken to relocate the Eritrean refugees far
from the border areas to the district of Qala en Nahal which
belonged to the Shukria tribe, but the particular sites where
the  refugees were settled were  either empty  or  sparsely
inhabited by West African immigrants.37
This is not only true in Sudan but is a common consid-
eration in many refugee-hosting countries in Africa. For
example, the Banyarwanda refugees were settled in the
border areas of Uganda. In the early 1980s the refugees were
attacked by Obete’s government for their alleged support
for Yoweri Museveni’s resistance movement. As a result,
thousands were killed and the survivors were either de-
ported or scattered. Most African governments allege that
the reason they reject self-settlement of refugees in both
urban and rural areas is to avoid such dangers. Since such
dangers are rare occurrences, governments use such inci-
dents in attempts to justify their unjustifiable reception and
settlement strategies.
5. Shifting of Financial Responsibility to the International
Donor Communities
Refugees in segregated sites, besides being visible, can be
kept as distinct groups indefinitely. If they are allowed to
self-settle among local populations, they could easily melt
into local communities and become indistinguishable. This
among other things could weaken governments’ requests for
funds from donors. Thus, placement of refugees in spatially
segregated sites is seen as a necessary condition for shifting
the responsibility of meeting refugees’ needs to the interna-
tional donor community indefinitely. For example, some
refugees in the developing countries have been living in
refugee settlements and camps for over thirty years and, in
most cases, the international donor community has been
footing the bill for all this time. It is interesting to note in
this connection that, as pointed out earlier, all international
assistance is only channelled to those who are placed in
spatially segregated sites––namely, camps and settlements.
Those who are outside camps and settlements, particularly
in the urban areas, receive no international or any form of
assistance. Thus, governments have no incentive to allow
refugees to settle themselves.
However, the reason why aid agencies are reluctant to
provide assistance to urban refugees is because this would
undermine host governments’ policies and pull refugees to
urban centres from rural refugee camps and settlements. As
pointed out earlier, in Sudan, a large number of the Eritrean
and Ethiopian refugees are settled in cities and towns in
defiance of the government’s policy. As a result they are
subjected to periodic roundups, arbitrary detention, extor-
tion, payment of bribes, etc. Those without transnational
networks also suffer from lack of basic necessities such as
food, clothing, and shelter. The UNHCR and the other aid
agencies are aware of their plight but they argue they cannot
help them because this would be contrary to the host gov-
ernment’s policy. Hence the refugees have to either depend
on remittances or fend for themselves by different means.
6. Opportunities to Develop Previously Neglected Remote
Areas
The arrival of refugees in poor countries is invariably accom-
panied by provision of emergency relief provided the said
refugees are placed in camps which, in sub-Saharan African
countries, are  invariably  located  in  rural areas. In  most
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refugee-hosting countries, assistance is seldom provided to
refugees in urban areas. Egypt, South Africa, and to some
extent Kenya are probably the exceptions.
Many countries in Africa, at least in the past, relocated
refugees to self-sufficiency projects which are in most cases
based in remote areas. UNHCR and other donor agencies
often foot the bill for the development of the infrastructure,
including roads. This benefits local communities and the
government of the country concerned. For example, the
refugee settlements located in remote areas in Tanzania
produce large amounts of tobacco and food crops which
contribute to the country’s foreign exchange earnings and
regional food security, respectively. The six refugee settle-
ments in Qala en Nahal also used to produce substantial
amounts of the cash crop sesame. Prior to the establishment
of the Qala en Nahal refugee settlements, all the local popu-
lations used to migrate to the Rahad River during the dry
season. When the refugee settlements were established,
UNHCR with its partners established a reliable water sup-
ply system that enabled the local population to stay in their
villages throughout the year.38 There is thus evidence to
suggest that one of the reasons why governments do not
want refugees in urban areas and prefer to place them in
designated rural areas is to take advantage of UNHCR and
donor resources to develop areas previously neglected areas
due to lack of resources.
7. Minimization of Perceived Societal Insecurity
Societal security refers to “…the sustainability, within ac-
ceptable condition, of traditional patterns of language, cul-
ture and religious and national identity and custom.”39 It is
often assumed that it is only refugees seeking asylum in the
predominantly white societies of the North who experience
racism and discrimination. There is evidence to show that
even refugees who seek asylum in the South are sometimes
regarded as “pollutants” of host countries’ “cultural pu-
rity”40 and civic virtues. For example, in Sudan municipality
police in Khartoum wrote to the General Director of the
Police stating: “We have been watching, with great alarm,
the continuing refugee influx in Khartoum. Your Excellency
will undoubtedly agree that such an unorganised movement
will contribute to an increase in the rate of crime.”41 The
Khartoum Police Commissioner in his recommendation to
restrict the movement of refugees to the capital city wrote:
We write this in the hope that your Excellency will contact the
competent authority and propose to the Minister of the Interior
that he should use powers accorded to him by Article 10(2) of
the Regulation of Asylum Act, to restrict the refugee movement
from the camps. This will enable us to take the necessary measures
to stop this harmful movement which is becoming a threat to our
moral values and public decency.42
Anything that constitutes “a threat” to “moral values and
public decency” by definition constitutes a threat to societal
security, and one of the reasons why host governments are
determined to remove refugees from urban areas and place
them in camps and settlements is to “keep their cultural
purity” intact (sic). The Sudanese police authorities and
many nationals seem to regard the Eritrean and Ethiopian
refugees’ liberal lifestyles, particularly the relations between
the two sexes, as a threat to societal security. These are seen
as constituting a major threat to Sudanese religious and
cultural norms, as well as way of life. The experience of
refugees elsewhere, e.g. Tanzania, also shows that local hosts
do not seem to attach the same value to refugees’ lives and
physical safety as they would to a citizen’s. A Burundian
refugee living in Kigoma (a Tanzanian town) told Lisa
Malkki,
Apart from problems of food and lodging, the gravest problems
were only that citizens considered us to be savage animals. I say
this because sometimes, if one hits a Burundian, it was said, ‘Hit
harder, it is a refugee.’ For this we found ourselves to be without
value in their eyes.43
Though I have not conducted fieldwork in Egypt, a discus-
sion I held with a group of Eritrean refugees in the American
University in Cairo also showed that the host population and
government officials regarded them as representing a threat
to societal security. A few South Sudanese refugees I talked
to in Alexandria and Cairo also confirmed this.
Throughout this article it has been demonstrated that
local and national authorities of a range of African coun-
tries seek to segregate, control, and ignore the needs of
refugees in their midst, as they are seen to compete with
nationals for limited services while presenting a perceived
threat to their hosts’ security and way of life. It is argued
that these underlying factors, plus the protracted problems
for governments created by urbanization generally and
cross-border ethnic solidarity in the case of many refugee
movements in Africa, shape current hostile refugee policies
towards urban refugees.
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